

DRAFT (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
NATIVE LABOUR IN THE NORTHERN
MINING INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION

This paper will compare native employment trends in northern mines to total jobs provided, examine factors believed to have hindered significant native progress in this sector, and highlight essential elements in programs which have had some success in attracting and retaining native workers in the mining industry.

The paper will also examine significant policy changes and employment strategies recommended in various studies, but not implemented; and efforts will be made to determine if there are any recent changes in the employment policies of companies that would tend to restrict native hire.

The approach to this analysis would involve synthesis drawing for the most part on available data and existing studies.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Although the mining industry was active in the north since the early 1900's, it only became a major source of employment in the early to mid 1960's. This was made possible with the expansion in mineral activity from gold to include exploration and development of base

metals. Rankin Inlet Nickel Mine was the first in this group of base metal producing mines to be developed in the North. The mine went into production in 1956 and during most of this phase 1956-62, native employment exceeded 58.8% of total mine workforce or averaged 80 employees out of 136 workers.¹

The second of these mines to come on stream was Pine Point Mines Ltd., which went into production in 1964. Native employment at this mine increased from an initial 4.6% or ten native workers in a workforce of 210 employees in 1967 to 17.0% or 70 native workers out of a total mine workforce of 410 employees by 1970.²

During the period 1964-70, such mines as Echo Bay, Giant Yellowknife and Whitehorse Copper were developed and became operational, but no data are available on native employment at these mines for this period.

1) SOURCE: The Eskimo of Rankin Inlet, A Preliminary Report (NCRC-61-7, June 1961) By Robert G. and Lois Dailey.

2) SOURCE: "An Economic Evaluation of Indian and Metis Employment at Cominco Mine, Pine Point" by Dr. Paul Deprez, June 22, 1970.

In September 1968, a survey of native employment in Northern Mines was undertaken by the Economic Staff Group (DIAND) and employment statistics were established for the first time on a mine by mine basis for all producing mines in the North. The survey indicated that natives filled 91 or 4.5% of the total 2,002 mining jobs provided at the time. They filled 28 or 3.4% of the 820 provided in the Yukon and 63 or 5.3% of the 1,182 provided in the NWT. These are shown by individual mines at TABLES 1.1 and 1.2.

TABLE 1.1, NATIVE WORKERS IN YUKON MINES - SEPT. 1968

MINE	TOTAL MINE WORK FORCE	NATIVE COMPONENT	NATIVES AS % OF TOTAL
UNITED KENO	232	9	3.9
CASSIAR	265	4	1.5
MT. NANSEN	49	6	12.5
ARCTIC GOLD	95	0	0.0
NEW IMPERIAL	179	9	5.0
TOTAL YUKON	820	28	3.4

SOURCE: DIAND Economic Staff Group Report

"The Employment of Indidenes in the Territorial Mining Industry" *date?*

TABLE 1.2, NATIVE WORKERS IN NWT MINES - SEPT. 1968

MINE	TOTAL MINE WORK FORCE	NATIVE COMPONENT	NATIVES AS % OF TOTAL
GIANT	410	14	3.4
CON-RYCON	225	9	4.0
CANTUNG	82	1	1.2
DISCOVERY	85	2	2.3
PINE POINT	250	30	12.0
ECHO BAY	130	7	5.4
TOTAL NWT	1,182	63	5.3

SOURCE: DIAND Economic Staff Group Report

"The Employment of Indigenes in the Territorial Mining Industry"

Anticipated Increase in Native Job Training and Job Acceptance

Because of the flurry of activity taking place in exploration and preparations to expand the development base, due to a healthy upturn in the metals markets, it was anticipated that by 1974 the industry's labour force would rise from 2,002 employees to 2,600. There was hope that consonant with this growth natives could be trained and channelled into the 600 additional jobs. By 1974 the number of mining jobs in the north totalled 2,609 and natives occupied 175, or 6.7% of total. Compared to 1968, this represented 84 additional jobs filled by natives or 2.2% more of total mining jobs, but fell far short of the 600 more jobs hoped to be filled by natives.

The assumption of natives filling these 600 additional jobs was purely hypothetical and obviously extrapolated on the collective population of both the Yukon and Northwest Territories. As a practical undertaking, this would have meant an average of 100 native entrants or 17% indigenous participation a year for six years. Based on population distributions by territory, as seen from TABLE 1.3 this would hardly have been possible particularly in the Yukon where the total native population was only 2,577.

TABLE 1.3, ETHNIC ORIGIN OF THE TERRITORIAL POPULATION

	TOTAL POPULATION	NON-NATIVES	NATIVES	NATIVES AS % OF TOTAL
YUKON	14,628	12,051	2,577	17.6
NWT	22,098	8,068	14,030	63.5
TOTAL				
TERRITORIAL	36,726	20,119	16,607	43.3

SOURCE: 1961 Census Data

Another unrealistic assumption was to presume that significant numbers of natives would be willing to work in mines. As at May 1978, territorial mining jobs totalled 2,736 and only 144 or 5.2% of total was filled by natives. This represented 31 less jobs filled by natives in 1978 as opposed to 1974. The greatest decline was in the

Northwest Territories where there were 29 less natives in mining despite the creation of 399 additional mining jobs in the NWT between 1974 and 1978. The territorial governments discontinued the collection of native employment data within the industry as of May 1978, and therefore no further comparisons are possible. However, as a final recap. of former trends in native employment within the industry for the decade 1968-78, TABLE 1.4 has been constructed.

TABLE 1.4, TRENDS IN NATIVE EMPLOYMENT

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TOTAL MINING JOBS</u>	<u>TOTAL NATIVES</u>	<u>NATIVES AS % OF TOTAL</u>
1968	2002	91	4.5
1974	2609	175	6.7
1978	2763	144	5.3

This decline in native employment prompted many speculations as to cause. Most commonly assumed was that the natives feared underground work or that they had developed an aversion to mining as an occupation. There is little basis for doubting these assumptions or denying that they could have affected participation and retention levels. However, events subsequently proved that the relatively small labour force scattered over an area one third the size of Canada and seldom located near the resource being developed was by far more effective in limiting workers to the industry.

Another inhibiting factor, was the fact that those most qualified for mining jobs were invariably the best hunters and often possessed the leadership qualities required in the home community, thus there was constant pressure to keep them in the settlements. Typical of this type of community pressure is the Fort Franklin situation. As a result of the Echo Bay mine expansion, 50 jobs were made available to natives, 25 above ground and 25 underground. Mine officials indicated a preference for workers from Fort Franklin, but were only able to recruit 20 workers from the community out of an estimated male labour force of 137 of which 75 were considered prime mine workers. The major hinderance as reported by Bob Rankin. Employment liaison officer, G.N.W.T. was reluctance on the part of the community to see so many people leave the settlement at the same time, which invariably would have been a mix of their best hunters and people with leadership qualities.

SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS IDENTIFIED IN VARIOUS STUDIES

In general, the problems associated with native participation were described in various studies as multiple and complex. Factors identified basic to these problems in most of the studies are highlighted in the following scenarios.

1. Lack of Contingency Plans

This was identified as a major flaw in the Rankin Inlet situation. Initially, "boatloads"¹ of native workers were brought in by the company from Eskimo Point and Chesterfield Inlet with the co-operation of the Department of Northern Affairs. Others were subsequently relocated from Coral Harbour and Baker Lake, by the federal government as a consequence of its initiatives to assist native people to move from wage-labour situations to wage-based economies.

These moves were undertaken without specific plans to help the workers and their families re-adjust to former life styles when the mine closed or to provide them with continuous wage employment to which they had become accustomed. The up-shot therefore was an aftermath of social problems which in the opinion of many, seriously affected further efforts to relocate native workers for industrial employment.

¹Occasional Papers II, Eskimo Underground Socio-Cultural Change in the Canadian Arctic. P III
By: Robert G. Williamson

2. Lack of Proper Co-ordination Between
Construction of Infrastructure and Native Hire

This factor was most peculiar to the Pine Point Development. Dr. Paul Deprez indicated in his study entitled "An Economic Evaluation of Indian and Metis Employment at Cominco Mines, Pine Point" that native participation could have been greatly enhanced if in the initial stages there had been better co-ordination between the hiring of native people and the construction of infrastructure i.e. roads and housing to facilitate easier access to the mine site and accommodate intersectoral transfers of labour from nearby communities.

The lack of housing was also a factor. Due to these shortages a policy of preferential housing allocation based on skill requirement was followed. Few natives possessed these skills and were thus the last to be accommodated.

3. Premium Wages, Job Regularity
and Ability to Commute Daily

The absence of premium wages and salaries, job regularity and inability to commute on a daily basis to home communities were identified by Dr. W.J. Lampé, in his study on "Native People's

Perceptions of Factors Associated with Job Acceptance and Retention" as major deterrents to native job acceptance with the industry.

Historically, mining wages have always been competitive with those paid by other industrial sectors because of the difficulty in attracting workers to the industry; and job-regularity was guaranteed by virtue of high turnover. Non-transiency or inability to commute on a daily basis will remain a problem particularly to development properties in remote locations. However, rotation was introduced as an alternative to relocation and the concept which was not unfamiliar to natives who in the urbanized context would be absent to hunt and trap for similar periods was widely accepted. Some examples of native response to worker-rotation schemes are the Rabbit Lake situation and more recently the Nanisivik program. Because of the advantages of rotation over relocation, as many as 63 natives were gainfully employed during the development stages of Nanisivik mine; some, from as far away as Coppermine. Also, many expressed a willingness to stay-on in permanent jobs when the mine became operational, but few qualified for entry level positions in the operation phase, because of low educational levels. Based therefore on this positive response in job acceptance and particularly willingness to accept permanent jobs and rotate for the life of their employment at the mine seem to suggest that commuting on a daily basis to home communities was of

less significance to natives in their decision of job acceptance or rejection than presupposed in the Lampé study.

With regard to previous wages earned by the sample group as indicated in the Lampé study, these are shown at tables 1.5 and 1.6. As to how they compared with average weekly wages and salaries paid by other Industrial Divisions across Canada, reference could be made to (Appendix A). It is commonly alleged that in some cases natives were paid less than whites but there is no available evidence to substantiate this claim. However, the fact that most industrial sectors contained a range of occupations with differing incomes and wage scales based on educational and skill qualifications, and natives were invariably less educated and technically skilled than whites, it stands to reason that they would tend to concentrate where the educational requirements were less stringent.

TABLE 1.5, LOWEST INCOME ON PRIOR JOBS IN RELATION TO PRESENT

DECISIONS TO REJECT OR ELECT SIMILAR JOB

PRIOR HOURLY PAY RATES - LOW	EXPERIENCED BY		CURRENT REJECT		CURRENT ELECT	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Less than \$1	18	20.2	17	19.1	1	1.1
\$1 to \$1.99	46	51.7	43	48.3	3	3.3
\$2 to \$2.99	18	20.2	16	18.0	2	2.2
\$3 to \$3.99	6	6.7	1	1.1	5	5.6
\$4 to \$4.99	1	1.1	—	—	1	1.1
TOTAL	89	99.9	77	86.5	12	13.3

SOURCE: "Native People's Perceptions of Factors Associated with Job
Acceptance and Rentention"

By: Dr. W.J.P. Lampé (May 1974)

TABLE 1.6, HIGHEST INCOME ON PRIOR JOBS IN RELATION TO PRESENT

DECISIONS TO REJECT OR ELECT SIMILAR JOB

PRIOR HOURLY PAY RATES - HIGH	EXPERIENCED BY		CURRENT REJECT		CURRENT ELECT	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
\$1 to \$1.99	2	2.2	2	2.2	—	—
\$2 to \$2.99	9	10.1	2	2.2	7	7.9
\$3 to \$3.99	19	21.3	—	—	19	21.3
\$4 to \$4.99	18	20.2	—	—	18	20.2
\$5 to \$5.99	20	22.5	—	—	20	22.5
\$6 to \$6.99	11	12.4	—	—	11	12.4
\$7 to \$7.99	9	10.1	—	—	9	10.1
Not Known	1	1.1	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	89	99.9	4	4.4	84	94.4

SOURCE: "Native People's Perceptions of Factors Associated with Job
Acceptance and Retention"

By: Dr. W.J.P. Lampé (May, 1974)

GOVERNMENT AND CORPORATE EFFORTS

To promote and sustain the effort of providing natives with industrial employment, a vocational training program and attendant placement functions were put in place, and adult education classes instituted. Employment Agreements were negotiated with most of the major operations and Mining Committees on the employment of Northern Natives were organized. The function of these committees was to work with industry in identifying areas where natives could be realistically employed and to assist in the formulation of training programs specifically designed to meet job requirements.

Territorial governments responsibility in this area of native development was to provide vocational training, basic upgrading, adult education and implement apprenticeship programs. They also provided pre-employment counselling to prospective trainees and their families and funded special programs for natives who did not meet the criteria for acceptance under Manpower programs. In some instances, they provided housing for trainees where shortages of such on-site infrastructure was a constraint to the placement of natives in apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs. These programs are now being complemented by Outreach, which is designed to improve the employability of people in remote communities where there is a lack of institutional, vocational and skill training to the level defined by labour market requirements.

CORPORATE ATTITUDE

Initially, most companies showed a great deal of social awareness toward the native situation. This was particularly demonstrated in their policies toward native hire and by the measures taken to ensure these policies worked. Such measures included the appointment of senior company officials to Mining Committees, on the employment of Northern Natives, implementation and cost-sharing of on-the-job training programs; providing apprenticeship positions as instruments to increase native participation and guaranteeing permanent employment to trainees upon successful completion of their training.

Unfortunately, the circumstance of low levels of education across the north as noted from the recent Nanisivik experience was a major handicap to more people benefiting from this training and being integrated into the industry's labour force.

SUMMARY PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS - INITIAL WORKERS

The foregoing thus exemplifies the initial difficulties in recruiting natives for mining occupations at a time when they were still accustomed to a life of liberty and by temperament ill-adapted to the rigours of mining, where there had been little or no exposure to schooling and where tuberculosis and other lung ailments or diseases inhibited significant numbers from participating in work activities with high dust levels. These factors, though not quantified in any

study or report in terms of effects upon the labour force, would have seriously restricted the flow of native workers to certain jobs and job areas within the industry. Particular cases would have been jobs in the operation of mines requiring specific levels of education and job areas of high dust levels such as underground work.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

In addition to these factors, it is believed that the frustrations and almost total traumatic experiences of relocatees to Con Mine, Yellowknife; and Sherritt Gordon Mines, Lynn Lake, from the Rankin Inlet era, may have contributed to the diminished interest in future programs for industrial employment. The extent to which native workers and their families were affected by these experiences have been documented by D.S. Stevenson in "Problems of Eskimo Relocation for Industrial Employment." As a result of his analysis, Stevenson found that during the intervening years there was a disturbingly wide variation in adjustment of the Eskimo families in these localities, which further deteriorated over the years into the usual syndromes of maladjustment such as: excessive use of alcohol, job absenteeism; persistent anti-social behaviour, frequent arrests for law infractions and the return of groups of disgruntled Eskimo families to their home settlements.

The primary causal factors underlying these problems were found to be: a lack of kin support at the workplace and thus the lack of a viable

social life, the lack of company housing which necessitated boarding Inuit workers unaware of the values about appropriate behaviour in non-Inuit communities in Euro-Canadian homes, thus resulting in endless controversies, particularly with respect to sanitation and non-payment of rents; and the lack of interaction between Inuit and non-Inuit women and between Inuit children and their white peer groups. As a result of these social pressures, many of the Inuit women were driven to alcoholic binges and from the depths of one woman's hurt and absolute dejection came the immortal words "Nunakhanginamahamoni"¹ I have no place in this land.

The plight of the miners themselves was in part the result of government's failure to follow-up on its promise and to the indiscretion of exposing them to a foreign culture for which they were ill-prepared. The vanguard of workers to these development projects, were promised by government and industry that other miners would be recruited from the Rankin Inlet operation. This would have provided the kin support and cohesiveness they so desperately needed to help them adjust to these heterogeneous situations, but the recruitment of other miners never materialized and their confidence in government declined.

¹ D.S. Stevenson, Problems of Eskimo Relocation for Industrial Employment.

Similarly, the intensity of co-residence problems and the controversies that developed because of the natives insensibility to what constituted normative behaviour in non-Inuit communities, could have been avoided by instructing the workers and their families at the community level about acceptable behaviour in other cultural situations before relocation took place.

CHANGE IN HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND LABOUR FORCE COMPOSITION

As the years progressed, and government programs in the areas of academic up-grading, vocational training and adult education took hold, a younger and better educated generation eventually formed the bulk of the native labour force. These people exhibited the same attitude toward work perceived as routine, hazardous and dehumanizing as their southern contemporaries and thus no gains were made in the level of participation despite increased levels in education and technical skills.

The negative effect this attitude was having on employment strategies to integrate natives into the industry's labour force, compelled developers to re-examine their native employment policies to bring them more in line with the changing values and expectations of this younger generation. Pioneers of this new approach were Amok Ltd., Syncrude Canada Ltd., and Eldorado Nuclear Ltd. These companies

brought in new and innovative programs placing special emphasis on training, access to employment, pre-employment counselling, cross-cultural sensitization, wage structures and worker-rotation schemes. Summary reports on these programs show they have had some success in attracting and retaining native workers, but thus far there is no indication of any efforts being made to incorporate useful and practical elements from these programs into Employment Support systems North of 60°. Instead, developers operating in the Yukon and Northwest Territories, faced with still greater manpower problems and the dilemma of the high cost of operating in the North, seemed to have further mechanized their operations as a means of overcoming these labour shortages and erosion of their profit margins.

This shift to improved technology and greater mechanization of the industry automatically down-graded the institutional and technical training that was being provided to natives, made some existing skills obsolete and was in effect, another hurdle in the long line of obstacles to the process of easing native workers willing to work in mines into this sector of the northern economy.

So far, no attempt has been made to measure the affect this change has had on limiting native workers to the industry or to determine the type of changes that would be necessary in curricula and technical content to meet the performance criteria of upgraded functions.

Given however, that a recent study undertaken by the Mining Association of Canada on Human Resource Planning in the Canadian Mining Industry, show that the industry is suffering from an acute lack of skilled tradesmen and that technological change is likely to increase the need for higher technical skills, an obvious approach to this problem would probably be to move substantially away from the notion of producing skilled people to the concept of producing a new type of worker who would not be so skilled as he would be analytical and technically up to date. Such an approach would require the support and co-operation of industry and unions to be successful.

The industry's role would be in such areas as shared training costs, input into new training programs of a nature that could be translated into worker qualifications; formulation of new employment policies and where necessary implementation of affirmative action plans to ensure compliance with stated objectives.

The union's role for this purpose could be as a catalyst to defuse problems likely to arise among non-native members who might perceive preferential treatment of native workers as discrimination in reverse.

of such skills among the resident population i.e. natives and non-natives, it is not unreasonable to assume that the northern situation would be worse than the rest of the country, given that there is an acute critical skill gap in all occupations of a skilled or semi-skilled nature in the North let alone specialized areas. Moreover, justification that these shortages not only exist in the North but are critical is clear from Anvil's current recruiting campaign in Cape Breton, for trades people per se and Nanisivik's willingness to recruit its entire staff from the south were it not for a native employment clause in the company's agreement with government restricting this option.

SELECTION AND PREPARATORY ORIENTATION

Because of the difficulty in recruiting trainable people to the industry, greater emphasis should probably be placed on high school graduates immediately coming into the labour market and on lower grade students as sources of incremental labour supply. Preparatory however, to orientation into practical mining, students should be made aware of the various careers in mining and the role they play in the development and production of ores. This information would give students interested in mining as an occupation some rudimentary guidance in the selection of courses that would lead to the career of their choice.

Communicating this information to students could be done through the school system. As a first step, professional people could be invited from the industry to explain the concepts of mining, ore refining and processing and end use of the product. Complementary to this, could be the introduction of career related courses in school curricula and exposure to practical mining situations. An outline of course content in many of these fields was compiled by the Education Committee of the Sudbury Branch of the Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, entitled "The Mineral Industry Story".

These steps if properly co-ordinated and put across effectively, should stimulate sufficient student interest in mining as would create a positive reaction to the industry. As a consequence, those who elect to pursue mining as an occupation would because of their higher academic qualifications be better able to cope with the training demands of many of these higher paying jobs where the turnover rate is significantly lower than in less sophisticated job areas. Entrance into these job areas would open up a whole new world of work to the Natives.

Also, given that developers would continue their efforts to improve the image of mining and try to satisfy as full a range of existensial needs as practical, i.e. wages, safety and security and conditions conducive to self-actualization at the work place, sufficient of these better educated natives might be attracted to the industry as would

form the nucleus of a permanent native component within the work force of many producing mines. Momentum in participation and a further break-through to professionalism could successively follow as each year would bring to the labour market a more capable and better educated employee. The numerical impact this younger generation would likely have on the labour market in the medium and long-term could be seen from Appendices A and B.

THE YUKON SITUATION - POSSIBLE MIX OF NATIVE
AND NON-NATIVE LABOUR SUPPLY TO 1990

From Appendix A, the ratio of natives to whites indicate there would be one native to every 7 white coming into the job market to the end of the present decade. Based on this trend, 21,600 people of labour force age including 2,135 native Indians would impact upon the labour market by 1990. In a tight job market such as being experienced in the Yukon and underscored by a 16.6% unemployment rate (or in real numbers 1,896 unemployed) as of January 1980, there would seem a need for renewed and continuous government/industry effort to ensure native workers would have a chance against such odds.

Also, present mining jobs in the Yukon are equal to 11.5% of the labour force, and could by 1990 plummet to as low as 3.9% given the status of projected mining jobs (TABLE 1.16) in relation to perceived labour growth (Appendix A). Assuming that jobs provided by the other

employment sectors continue to equal 71.9% of the labour force with growth in the mining sector remaining stagnant, there could be in addition to the 1,896 unemployed as of January 1980, an additional 3,866 for a total of 5,762 jobless workers in the Yukon by the end of the decade. Technically, these would constitute manpower surpluses and could be regarded as labour supply.

THE NWT SITUATION - POSSIBLE MIX OF NATIVE
AND NON-NATIVE LABOUR SUPPLY TO 1990

The lack of information on the Inuit and Metis population of labour force age inhibit a complete break-out of the ethnic groupings comprising the labour force and the establishment of precise ratios of native to white workers likely to impact upon the labour market to the end of the present decade. In the absence of this hard data, a hypothetical approach will be taken to determine the level of labour likely to be available to 1990.

Commencing with the basic information on hand, at December 31/78, Indians and Inuit of labour force age totalled 12,338¹ (Indians 4,458, Inuit 7,800) and whites 16,391 for a total of 28,729².

On a percentage basis, the Inuit constituted 27.4%, the Indians 15.6% and whites 57%. In terms of native to white impact upon the labour market, this was equivalent to about one native to each white.

At June 1980, the experienced labour force totalled 21,411³. In contrast, full-time jobs provided by government and the service sector equalled 39.8%, in the mining industry 8.5% and land-based economies provided part-time jobs equalled to 18%. Thus to summarize, there was a maximum of 48.3% full-time employment, 18% part-time and 33.7% unemployment or in real numbers 7,215 unemployed.

Additional data on hand ⁴ indicate there will be an ethnic mix of 43,300 people of labour force age in the Northwest Territories by 1990, made up of 6,018 registered Indians and 37,282 others including Inuit and Metis (Appendix B). Assuming there is no significant improvement in job creation and consequently no real change in the rate and level of full-time employment, the net unemployed or people of working age who would be without jobs could approximate 21,800 by year 1990. Again these would be in a technical sense manpower surpluses and could be regarded as probable "labour supply".

COMPARISON OF LABOUR SUPPLY AND FORESEEABLE MINING DEMAND TO 1990

Given an already saturated labour market by 1990 as indicated from the foregoing, it could be concluded on the basis of manpower surpluses (Yukon approx. 6,000, N.W.T. over 20,000) and foreseeable mining jobs by year 1990 (Yukon 725, N.W.T. 1,541) that labour supply would be

infinitely greater than mining demand. However, the fact that the industry is constantly in need of workers because of high turnover; is the major economic institution in the north, and is likely to survive contemplated macro-projects in the oil and gas sector, action for sustained employment of northern residents should be oriented to opportunities within this industry.

This suggests that Territorial governments in their career development strategies should place greater emphasis on activities within this sector, and students in recognition of the severe limitations in career choices within the Territories should be willing to adjust their employment aspirations to existing opportunities. Management on the other hand would have to make some concessions to accommodate this new generation of miners.

LABOUR RELATIONS

Except for a few isolated cases of dissatisfaction over wage parity, native disenchantment with the industry seemed to have been related by and large to social problems (i.e. being relegated to dirty or labouring tasks, locked into repetitive and boring jobs and expected to conform to the southern work ethic of working hard for plenty) and not primarily to economic issues. These conditions existed initially due to a lack of skilled natives and persisted because of the slow

rhythm in skill development and adaptation. These factors notwithstanding, most companies hold an open-door policy toward native hire and they are privy to union protection in addition to rights and privileges set out in employment agreements. However, the role of the Union in the process of labour relations seemed not to have been properly understood by the natives and there have been instances of individual and group recalcitrance toward the paying of dues.

However, in retrospect to these elements, and the fact that natives in mines have always been insignificant in terms of numbers, it is unlikely they would have played a significant role in the industrial disputes that have plagued the industry since 1976.

EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ON LABOUR RELATIONS

As measured by the number of days lost due to industrial strife, labour relations in the northern mining industry seem to be deteriorating in recent years. Most recent data show that a total of 485 days were lost in 1980 as compared to 226 in 1976, an increase of over 114 percent (TABLE 1.18).

TABLE 1.16 MINING JOBS CURRENT AND PROJECTED - YUKON 1981-1990

Existing Mines	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Anvil	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560
United Keno	300	300	300	300	-	-	-	-	-	-
Whitehorse Copper	200	200	200							
<hr/>										
Potential New Mines										
Venus	45	45	45	45	45					
Mel	(No Estimate Available)									
Mactung				165	165	165	165	165	165	165
Tom	(No Estimate Available)									
Jason	(No Estimate Available)									
Bonnet Plume	(No Estimate Available)									
Howard's Pass	(No Estimate Available)									
	1,100	1,105	1,105	1,070	770	725	725	725	725	725

* Figures projected for producing mines to 1980 were determined on the basis of current production levels and proven ores.

** For potential new mines, they are extracts of labour force approximations taken from appropriate feasibility studies.

TABLE 5, Yukon Economic Review, Economic Research and Planning Unit, Government of Yukon

TABLE 1.17 MINING JOBS CURRENT AND PROJECTED - N.W.T. 1981-1990

Existing Mines	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Giant	347	347	347	347	347					
Con-Rycon	289	289	289	289	289	289	289	289	289	289
Cantung	206	206	206	206	206	206	206	206	206	206
Pine Point	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571
Echo Bay	133	133	133							
Nanisivik	221	221	221	221	221	221	221			
Terra	55	55	55							
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Potential New Mines										
Arvik <i>Polaris</i>		225	225	225	225	225	225	225	225	225
Cullaton Lake		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Prairie Creek		200	200	200	200	200				
Lupin	200	200	200	200	200	200				
Borealis					150	150	150	150	150	150
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	2,022	2,547	2,547	2,359	2,709	2,162	1,762	1,541	1,541	1,541

* Figures projected for producing mines to 1990 were determined on the basis of current production levels and proven ores.

** For potential new mines they are extracts of labour force approximations taken from appropriate feasibility studies.

¹ and ²Research Branch, Corporate Policy, DIAND, 8-79 and Statistics Canada Population Projections, Canada and the Provinces 1972-2001.

³Contributed by Mr. B. Rankin, Government of N.W.T.

⁴Population projections Methodological Report, Northwest Territories 1978-1988, Statistics Section and Population Projections Canada and the Provinces 1972-2001, Statistics Canada.

TABLE 1.18 MAJOR STRIKES & LOCKOUTS - NORTHERN MINING INDUSTRY 1976-81

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES INVOLVED</u>	<u>DURATION OF STRIKE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1976	Cyprus Anvil	475	120 days	
1976	Whitehorse Copper	214	58 days	
1976	United Keno	252	48 days	
1980	Giant Yellowknife	340	90 days	
1980	United Keno	303	212 days	Still in Progress
1980	Cantung	280	185 days	Still in Progress

Thus far, there is no record of significant native involvement in any of these disputes, but a shift in disposition is not unlikely among the younger generation of native miners. Better informed and more aware of the advantages of industrial democracy they are likely to use every mechanism, adversary or otherwise to bring about change. This course of action could precipitate further industrial strife and would be counter-productive in attracting workers to the industry.

Recently, government has shown some indication toward developing an advocacy role with Unions to assist Indians and Inuit to qualify for employment in unionized corporations. If this proves successful, the next logical step would be for government, union and management to get

together and work out realistic policies for the development of a human resource framework that would allow these workers to realize their full potential within the context of the work environment. This mechanism while not necessarily conforming to the principles of complete worker autonomy should nevertheless allow the workers some decision-making in processes related to their functions and thus help to eliminate or at least minimize the kind of shop-floor reaction that often provides the impetus for strike action.

INVOLVEMENT OF THE INUIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (IDC) AND OTHER LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Inuit Development Corporation (IDC) and other local organizations should also be invited to participate in the formulation of such a framework. These organizations being close to the people and invariably of the people would make it easier for individual natives to articulate their feelings as to whether or not they perceive mining as a desired occupation and how current policies and conditions could be changed to make mining jobs more attractive and acceptable to them. By not communicating this information to government or mine management in the past, many of the measures taken to increase the level of native participation were obviously based on wrong premises and thus could not have been otherwise than partially successful or outright failures.

Also, events have proven that the development of political awareness in the North brought the younger and better educated people to a new consciousness of inalienable rights among which resource ownership figures most prominently. They see the development of new mines and significant native participation in activities related to mineral extraction within their homeland as likely to prejudice negotiations of resource ownership and they have become quite dogmatic about the fact that so long as southerners own land, mines, transportation, etc., then for so long will the wealth of the north flow outwards into the hands of these elements. IDC's recent investment in the Cullaton Lake project could go a long way in helping to reverse this trend of thinking. Thus, by encouraging local organizations to participate could be a very useful tool in not only helping to increase the level of native employment, but could also be of significant importance in bringing new concepts to the process that would ensure additional benefits to natives other than becoming involved in direct mining occupations.

CONCLUSION

The efforts made by government to provide natives with a viable alternative to a depressed land-based economy by moving them into a wage-earning system i.e. mining jobs, etc., have generally been viewed as a complete failure. However, while there have been few cases so numerically outstanding as to change this opinion it seems totally

unfair to use numbers as the only criteria to measure the results of these efforts in light of existing circumstances, e.g.; a relatively small northern labour force scattered over an area one third the size of Canada, the misfortune that the resource being developed was seldom located near areas of high population densities; relatively low levels of education across the north, exemption of a significant percentage of the labour force from jobs with high dust level content, because of the high rate of respiratory diseases and other lung ailments and the fact that those most qualified for mining occupations invariably possessed the type of leadership qualities required in the settlement and that enormous community pressure was constantly exerted to keep them at home.

A much more reasonable assessment would have been to think in terms of the value and gains made in skill training which even conservatively were more than appreciable both in quantity and quality, and which although not always utilized by industry was of inestimable value in the sense of securing community-based jobs which most natives prefer to mining occupations. Also, a significant lesson to be learned from this exercise and worthwhile bearing in mind in our expectations with respect to future employment programs is the value of concentrating on the quality of the Northern work force rather than the quantity since as this analysis has proven merely attempting to find bodies to fill jobs nearly always ends in disaster.

AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES AND SALARIES, CANADA, BY INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
 SELECTED YEARS 1939 -1979

Year	Industrial Composite	Forestry	Mining	Manufac- turing	Construc- tion	Transportation Communi- cation & Other Utilities	Trade/ Wholesale and Retail	Finance Insurance and Real Estate	Service
1939	\$ 23.44	\$ 17.37	\$ 28.69	\$ 22.79	\$ 18.83	\$ 26.68	\$ 21.83	\$ 29.59	\$ 16.33
1942	28.62	20.70	34.81	28.99	27.29	31.70	24.07	31.46	18.21
1952	54.41	55.84	65.79	56.36	55.82	56.81	46.08	49.35	34.23
1957	67.90	69.03	83.58	70.70	79.47	69.52	56.07	62.32	48.04
1962	80.54	82.15	98.53	84.00	86.36	86.44	66.53	75.35	59.31
1963	83.27	87.02	101.96	86.90	93.59	90.10	68.80	77.63	60.44
1964	86.51	92.13	105.73	90.42	98.47	93.68	71.07	81.88	62.30
1965	91.01	96.71	111.53	94.78	108.40	98.84	73.49	88.29	65.76
1966	96.34	104.79	119.51	100.16	120.21	103.55	76.89	93.04	70.25
1967	102.83	113.64	129.81	106.54	130.93	113.20	85.93	99.02	75.39
1968	109.88	122.04	139.16	114.42	137.59	122.70	86.91	106.21	78.99
1969	117.63	113.60	148.93	122.93	150.68	131.03	93.81	113.83	84.23
1970	126.82	137.60	164.70	132.75	167.15	142.35	100.50	120.52	90.65
1971	137.64	155.53	177.00	143.99	188.26	154.14	108.45	129.59	98.57
1972	149.22	172.92	190.29	156.10	209.90	167.94	117.58	140.79	107.32
1973	160.46	197.04	211.42	167.48	225.45	181.89	126.49	154.54	114.53
1974	178.09	219.64	238.97	185.62	250.30	204.39	139.92	172.25	126.08
1975	203.34	249.58	280.44	213.43	290.95	233.98	159.06	193.12	143.68
1976	223.03	287.36	317.13	241.19	331.02	262.02	176.59	213.71	160.49
1977	249.95	312.81	348.12	266.04	369.88	291.15	190.96	229.57	171.28
1978	265.37	326.48	376.40	285.67	389.64	313.28	201.79	248.43	180.00
1979 ^p	286.95	360.86	415.77	309.66	422.70	399.32	217.93	270.16	192.23

^p Preliminary (Based upon available figures for first ten months of 1979)

Source: Statistics Canada, Catalogue #72002

PROJECTIONS OF LABOUR FORCE AGE PROFILE — YUKON 1981-1990

APPENDIX B

YEAR	15-19		20-24		25-29		30-34		35-39		40-44		45-49		50-54		55-59		60-64		TOTAL		
	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	NMT	OTH	
1981	429	2271	373	1927	268	1432	181	2019	157	2143	135	1565	105	1095	94	1106	76	824	59	641	1877	15,023	16,900
1982	419	2281	408	2092	274	1526	188	1912	179	2071	128	1672	105	1295	93	1107	77	823	71	629	1942	15,408	17,350
1983	376	2324	425	2075	285	1715	199	1801	189	2111	126	1874	113	1287	96	1104	82	818	67	633	1958	15,742	17,700
1984	351	2349	435	2265	305	1895	219	1681	181	2119	137	1963	119	1381	90	1110	89	911	69	631	1995	16,305	18,300
1985	321	2379	437	2263	324	1976	245	1755	179	2121	142	2158	121	1479	93	1107	91	1009	71	729	2024	16,976	19,000
1986	297	2403	411	2489	362	2038	256	1644	176	2024	149	2151	130	1570	100	1100	89	1011	70	730	2040	17,260	19,300
1987	272	2428	402	2498	395	2205	262	1738	183	2017	170	2030	124	1776	99	1301	87	1113	72	828	2066	17,934	20,000
1988	283	2517	360	2540	412	2288	273	1827	194	1806	179	2221	121	1779	106	1594	90	1110	76	824	2094	18,606	20,700
1989	266	2634	336	2464	420	2380	291	1909	214	1886	172	2128	132	1968	112	1488	84	1116	83	817	2110	18,799	20,909
1990	262	2638	308	2592	422	2478	310	2090	239	1761	170	2230	138	2162	114	1466	88	1112	84	916	2135	19,465	21,600

SOURCE: RESEARCH BRANCH, CORPORATE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS, 8-79 AND POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR CANADA AND THE PROVINCES, STATISTICS CANADA 1972-2001

PROJECTIONS OF LABOUR FORCE AGE PEOPLE — N.W.T., 1981-1990

APPENDIX C

YEAR	15-19		20-24		25-29		30-34		35-39		40-44		45-49		50-54		55-59		60-64		TOTAL		
	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	REG IND & OTH	INUIT IND & OTH	TOTAL
1981	1000	5000	852	3848	595	3005	527	3573	377	3323	340	2640	292	1908	261	1339	216	1084	153	747	4,613	26,467	31,080
1982	1019	5081	899	4101	631	3179	525	3575	396	3504	359	2641	283	2017	278	1522	224	1176	159	941	4,773	27,737	32,510
1983	1076	5224	905	4395	679	3321	533	3467	442	3558	362	2838	288	2112	281	1519	234	1166	173	927	4,973	28,527	33,500
1984	1116	5284	944	4756	723	3677	546	3454	476	3724	352	3048	301	2299	301	1599	232	1268	175	925	5,160	29,934	35,094
1985	1121	5379	961	5139	794	3906	563	3437	491	3809	360	3240	324	2276	289	1711	241	1359	192	1008	5,336	31,264	36,600
1986	1137	5363	984	5316	841	4159	581	3419	518	3782	368	3432	331	2469	286	1914	248	1352	201	1099	5,495	32,305	37,800
1987	1138	5162	1003	5497	888	4512	616	3584	517	3783	387	3613	350	2650	277	2023	265	1435	209	1091	5,650	33,350	39,000
1988	1066	5434	1058	5542	893	4807	664	3736	524	3776	431	3769	353	2847	282	2118	267	1533	219	1081	5,757	34,643	40,400
1989	1009	5591	1098	5602	931	5169	706	3994	537	3663	465	3935	343	3057	295	2305	287	1713	217	1183	5,898	36,212	42,100
1990	990	5810	1102	5698	949	5451	776	4224	554	3646	480	3920	350	3250	317	2283	275	1725	225	1275	6,018	37,282	43,300

SOURCE: RESEARCH BRANCH, CORPORATE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS, 8-79 AND POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR CANADA AND THE PROVINCES, STATISTICS CANADA 1972-2001